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Abstract: Using a survey approach, we ask consumers to reveal their preferences over pricing 
schemes that may differ in terms of the average price of consumption, the amount of price 
variation, and the probability of being rationed.  We find that consumers dislike pricing 
schemes that vary prices more but that they are willing to trade off price variation and rationing.  
Surprisingly, they are not willing to trade off an increase in price variation for a decrease in 
expected prices.  We discuss the implications of these findings for firm pricing policies. 
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Although many economists agree that the introduction of pricing schemes that vary prices 
in response to demand shocks would solve many congestion problems, doing so may also 
antagonize consumers as suggested by evidence from the behavioral literature.
3  Overall, it is not 
clear whether consumers would prefer a pricing rule that varies prices and eliminates congestion 
over a pricing rule that keeps price constant but sometimes rations demand.      
This paper follows a survey approach to address this issue.  In our hypothetical scenarios, 
we consider various pricing rules that manage a given congestible resource differently in 
response to demand shocks.  For the sake of concreteness, we select for our scenarios a beverage 
vending machine that may run out of cans when prices are kept constant and demand is high.  
This presents a natural environment where prices could be used to manage the stock more 
efficiently.  In fact, Coca Cola has considered such a possibility and we discuss this episode in 
more detail later.  Our basic question is the following:
Question 1. 
An operator of vending machines has been selling soft drinks at 60c.  When the 
weather is unusually hot, their vending machines typically run out of cans.  The 
company plans to introduce a new vending machine that varies price as a function 
of temperature.  Price would be 40c in cold weather and 80c in hot weather.  On 
average, the price would remain the same and the vending machines will less 
often run out of cans.  Please rate this new pricing policy as: 
(Completely Acceptable)   (Acceptable)   (Unacceptable)   (Completely Unacceptable) 
The question contrasts two pricing rules.  The initial pricing rule does not vary prices.  It 
corresponds to the way standard vending machines function.  In contrast, the proposed pricing 
rule varies prices to smooth demand shocks.  Each pricing rule is defined by three components: 
the average price, the amount of price variations, and the likelihood of rationing.  In different 
3 Vickrey (1971) pushed forward the concept of variable pricing (see Borenstein et al (2002) for recent proposals).  
Kahneman et al. (1986) were one of the first to present consumer evidence of consumer antagonism.  See also 
Carlton (1986) and Rotemberg (2004). 
1versions of the questionnaires, randomly assigned to respondents, we vary these attributes.  The 
objective of these variations is to isolate the subjects’ attitudes toward the different attributes of 
the pricing scheme. In particular, we want to investigate whether consumers are willing to trade 
off these attributes for one another. For example, if we find that consumers dislike rationing and 
price variation, we can ask how much reduction in rationing is necessary for consumers to accept 
a pricing rule that introduces a given amount of price variation.     
This work contributes to the debate on why firms that face congestion problems often do 
not vary prices in response to changes in demand.  Many factors influence a firm’s decision to 
vary prices (Blinder et al. 1998).
4  In this work, we pursue the hypothesis pushed forward in the 
behavioral literature that pricing schemes that vary prices may antagonize consumers 
(Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1986, and Frey and Pommerehne 1993, henceforth KKT and FP 
respectively).
5 We find that, in addition to disliking exploitative price increases, as already 
shown in the past survey literature, consumers also dislike pricing schemes that vary prices in the 
presence of demand fluctuations even if the expected price is held constant. This finding 
reinforces the conjecture that demand side considerations may explain why firms may be 
reluctant to introduce innovative pricing schemes.   
We also investigate the possibility that firms could compensate consumers when they 
introduce price variations.  Properly designed, the type of pricing schemes that have been 
proposed by economists to vary prices in the presence of demand fluctuations should increase 
overall welfare.  Firms could pass some of the efficiency gain to consumers in the form of lower 
4 Considerations include technological constraints, implementation and billing cost, complexity 
of communicating how these schemes works, political reasons, redistribution reasons, to name 
just a few. 
5 See as well surveys of revenue managers (Hall and Hitch 1939, Blinder et al. 1998, and 
Zbaracki et al. 2004) which are consistent with the antagonism hypothesis.  See Xia et al. (2004) 
for a review of the marketing literature. 
2overall prices, reduced likelihood of rationing, or both.  Our results suggest that consumers may 
respond only to the second incentive.
Finally, our findings may explain how firms design and present to consumers new pricing 
schemes that generate price variability. Our results suggest that firms should advertise the impact 
of variable pricing on rationing, and keep silent the impact on average price and especially on the 
maximum price. We discuss toward the end of the paper how one could apply our framework 
and argue that our findings seem consistent with casual observations from pricing practices.  
This paper is organized as follows.  The next section presents in more detail our approach 
and discusses how it relates to the existing literature.  Section 3 describes our survey design, its 
implementation, and the data.  Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes. 
2 Literature Review and Survey Scenarios 
Literature  
The focus of this work is on the possibility to vary price, in response to changes in 
demand, with the objective to reduce congestion.
6  This choice is motivated by the finding that 
consumers feel more strongly toward price variability caused by demand than by supply 
fluctuations.  Several survey studies have asked respondents to express how they feel toward 
price increases triggered by demand shocks.  The typical finding is that about two thirds or more 
of the respondents find such practices unfair. For example, a question from KKT (p.729) is: “A 
hardware store has been selling snow shovels for $15.  The morning after a large snowstorm, the 
store raises the price to $20. Please rate this action as: (Completely Fair) (Acceptable) (Unfair) 
(Very Unfair).”  In their sample, 82 percent responded ‘unfair’.  FP report similar conclusions:  
“The random survey reveals that pricing, at least in the context of an excess demand situation, is 
6 Price also vary to price discriminate, and this rationale is sometimes indistinguishable from 
congestion management. We exclude situations where price vary only to price discriminate 
without any impact on congestion management. 
3considered unfair by almost four out of five respondents” (p. 296).  (See also Dickson and 
Kalapurakal 1994, and Piron and Fernandez 1995).
Our approach differs from this literature in two ways.  First, previous consumer surveys 
almost always report consumer fairness or acceptability perception to price increases in response 
to a positive demand shock.
7  In this work, we are not interested in consumer attitude toward a 
single price increase but in their attitude toward pricing rules.  A pricing rule describes how 
prices change during positive demand shock events, as considered in the previous literature, but 
also negative demand shocks events where prices may decrease.  For example, a pricing rule 
could describe how the price vary over different periods of time (e.g. hour-of-the-day peak 
pricing), or, as we do in our questionnaire, how the price depends on observable weather shocks. 
In our application, a pricing rule is characterized by a distribution of prices, that specifies how 
prices vary as demand fluctuates, and by a likelihood of rationing.  We focus on this information 
alone because it is sufficient to compute the expected consumption utility under standard demand 
theory as we argue soon.  Behavioral economics has demonstrated that consumers may also care 
about other dimensions of the pricing rule such as framing and reference point. In the core of our 
study, we hold constant these other considerations and vary only the distribution of price (mean 
and variability) and the chance of rationing.
Second, past survey research has focused on consumer attitude toward the exploitative 
feature of price increases that are meant to deal with positive demand shocks.  Such price 
changes transfer surplus from consumers to producers.  We also consider pricing rules that clear 
markets, but in contrast with previous literature, we consider non-exploitative pricing rules, in 
the sense that there is no monetary transfer from consumers (as a group) to the producer, with 
7 Although such price changes may allocate the scarce resource more efficiently, it is almost 
obvious that, in the absence of transfers, most consumers would not benefit.  Only those 
consumers with very high valuation for the good may value the decrease in the probability of 
being rationed more than the monetary loss due to the increase in price. 
4respect to a rule that keeps prices constant.  In our reference question, we hold the level of price 
constant across fixed pricing and variable pricing, as an attempt to control for exploitation.  We 
then present variations of the basic question to investigate if it is possible to offer monetary 
compensation when price variation increases.   
Hypothesis
To motivate our approach, we present in the appendix a simple benchmark model, that 
builds up upon Oi’s argument (1972), to shows that consumers behaving according to rational 
theory would benefit from the introduction of price variability.  Focusing on a specific demand 
environment, the model demonstrates that a risk neutral representative consumer unambiguously 
benefits from the introduction of congestion pricing. Although we recognize that the model is not 
completely general, its purpose is to help formulate questions for which one can draw clear cut 
predictions under rational theory.
8
Briefly summarized, the representative consumer has random utility, and has to select, 
before the realization of her utility shock, a pricing rule which will later be used to price and 
allocate a fixed resource. The model shows that the consumer always prefers pricing schemes 
that vary prices in response to demand shocks, as long as the expected price does not increase.
The intuition is simply that under variable pricing the consumer may re-optimize, and possibly 
change her consumption decision, after observing the realized price.  Since the indirect utility 
function is convex in price, the consumer likes price variation.  The model shows that this will 
also hold in an equilibrium model where prices are used to clear markets.  Even though 
consumers have to pay more in the states of the world where all consumers value consumption 
more, they still prefer, from an ex-ante point of view, the rule that allocates the resource to those 
consumers who value it the most. 
8 With heterogeneous consumers, for example, congestion pricing may redistribute surplus 
across consumers and some consumers may be worse off.  
5An alternative theoretical benchmark corresponds to Kahneman and Tversky (1979) model 
of loss aversion.
9  To illustrate the point, we leave aside rationing considerations and assume that 
consumers consider a pricing policy that holds prices constant as the reference pricing rule.
Under loss aversion, consumers dislike a pricing rule that is equally likely to increase or decrease 
the reference price by a given amount.  Under extreme loss aversion, interpreted as a situation 
where consumers do not value the gains from lower prices, consumers dislike any pricing rule 
that sometimes increase prices even if prices almost always decrease.
We design our questions to match the environment presented in the benchmark model 
presented in the appendix and such that a hypothetical respondent who would behave according 
to rational choice theory would be in favor of variable pricing.  If we find that some of the 
consumers, or a majority of them, find variable pricing unacceptable, then we can conclude that 
there exist other motives that may influence consumer decisions.      
To summarize our predictions, let A represent the acceptability of a pricing rule. Holding 
everything else constant, this function may depend on the average level of price, p, the variability 
in price, V, and the probability of rationing S,
A(p,V,S).
According to both behavioral theory and rational choice theory we expect that acceptability 
should decrease under both an increase in average price or in rationing probability.  The two 
theories differ when one considers an increase in price variability.  According to rational choice, 
one would expect acceptability to increase with price variability while according to behavioral 
one should expect the opposite.
Summary of Predictions 
9 Alternatively, one could assume that consumers are risk averse.  We do not pursue this 
hypothesis because the financial amounts at stake are very small in our case study.




We recognize that this framework is very stylized.  The tri-dimensional decomposition of a 
pricing rule into (p,V,S) greatly simplifies the investigation of whether consumers have 
preferences over the rules that govern how prices are set. In practice, consumer may have more 
complex preferences and may care about additional attributes to the ones we have considered 
here.  The approach pursued here is a first stab at the problem that allows us to investigate some 
important trade-offs and also to discriminate between two central theories.
Real and Perceived Exploitation 
The past survey literature has not made the distinction between a change in expected price 
and a change in price variability as we do in this paper.  In the snow shovel question presented 
earlier, for example, both the level of price and the amount of price variations increase when the 
store increases prices in the event of a snowstorm.  Our approach allows us to disentangle 
consumer attitude toward these two dimensions of a pricing policy. 
We distinguish two different concepts of exploitation. Real exploitation occurs when a 
change in pricing rule increases the level of price p holding the other two dimensions (VS)
constant.  We label this type of price variation ‘real exploitation’ because there is a monetary 
transfer from the consumer to the producer.  Perceived exploitation occurs if the change in 
pricing rule increases the level of price variation V holding the other two dimensions (p,S)
constant.   Under such a change, there is no monetary loss in expectation for a consumer who 
does not change her consumption plan, and possibly an increase in surplus if the consumer does 
7so.  Still, this change in the pricing rule could be perceived as exploitative because the resulting 
pattern observed by the consumer is that prices increase when demand increases. Such an 
interpretation is consistent with KKT, who argue that consumers demonstrate an ‘opposition to 
exploitation of shortages’. 
Scenarios
Following Okun (1981) and past survey literature, we select an hypothetical scenario from 
a customer market.
10  Our scenario is drafted after the experience of Coca-Cola with responsive 
pricing.  The company began testing in 1999 a vending machine with a temperature sensor and 
computer chip to determine when to automatically raise prices for its drinks in hot weather, a 
variable known to affect demand.  Coca-Cola’s chairman and chief executive Douglas Ivester 
argued that the technology would cater to the basic law of supply and demand, as consumers’ 
desire for cold drinks increases in hot weather and each machine has a fixed capacity.  When the 
news became public, however, many were shocked by the proposal.  Pepsi was quick to state that 
it was not considering a similar innovation. A public relation fiasco followed “causing Coke to 
promptly deny that it would ever have a vending machine do any such thing.”  (Washington Post, 
27 September 2000, p. A1).  Given that the scheme was never rolled out, it is not clear whether 
the consumer backlash was due to the fact that consumers expected that Coca Cola would use the 
new scheme in an exploitative way (real exploitation or increase in p), or whether consumers 
were hostile to the idea that price could vary per se (perceived exploitation or increase in V).  In 
our survey questions, we are careful to control for these two dimensions of exploitation by 
always giving detailed information on changes in the entire distribution of prices.   
3 Survey and Data 
10 In customer markets, suppliers are perceived as making their own pricing decisions, have some 
monopoly power, and have repeat business with consumers.   
8We consider four main questions describing different scenarios. In each question we start 
by describing a reference situation, in which there is rationing if prices do not vary.  As 
mentioned in the introduction, this initial situation corresponds to the way most vending 
machines function.  We contrast this reference situation with four alternative scenarios where 
prices vary depending on demand realizations.  
Question 1 is reported above. Questions 2-4 introduce simple variations to this basic 
question.  In addition, we also consider a question equivalent to the snow shovel question in 
KKT, but framed in the context of our scenario (Question 5). This last question will be used to 
establish that our survey design is consistent with previous survey literature.
Data
The survey was conducted on first year students in business economics at the University of 
Turin on 21 and 22 March 2006. A one-page survey form was given to each student at the 
beginning (or the end) of the first lecture of the Basic Microeconomics course.
11  Each 
questionnaire contained one of the four main questions. In addition, 20 percent of the 
questionnaires included Question 5. Question 5 was matched with equal frequency with each of 
the four main questions.  When two questions were included, two different versions of the 
questionnaire presented the questions in different order. This survey structure balances the need 
to maximize the number of responses to each question and the need to minimize the number of 
questions in each survey to avoid the possibility of interaction between questions. 
Each questionnaire included a series of questions regarding individual characteristics such 
as gender, educational achievement of the mother and father, occupation of mother and father, 
family income, political preferences covering the whole spectrum from very conservative to very 
liberal.  In addition, we asked whether subjects had taken economics courses before, as some 
students may have been retaking the course because they failed or were asked to do so because 
11 The Italian version of our survey forms, actually used to collect data, is available upon request. 
9they were transferred from other universities with different curricula.  Descriptive statistics are 
presented in Table 1.
A total of 519 students from 3 different groups participated in the experiment. Each 
student was randomly assigned one version of the survey. Some questionnaires were not fully 
filled, while only a few were not correctly filled (e.g. a double preference was given instead of 
one as required). Overall, 448 questionnaires (75 percent) were completely and correctly filled.  
Our survey design is broadly similar to that of KKT and FP. The structure of the questions, 
for example, is the same. A basic scenario is used as a reference and it is compared to an 
alternative scenario in which a hypothetical firm varies prices following demand shocks. The 
amount of price variability introduced in these scenarios is also comparable. Similarly, as in 
KKT and FP, subjects are asked to choose among 4 alternative acceptability levels.  
Although the details of the scenarios described in our questions differ from KKT and FP, 
we choose a consumption good (soft drink) very similar to that of FP (bottle of water). For such 
goods, demand is stochastic (for example because of weather conditions) but costs of production 
tend to remain stable over time. These are also the salient characteristics of the demand for snow 
shovels (KKT), for which weather conditions may unexpectedly increase consumers’ demand.
12
Consistence with KKT 
12 Our survey design slightly differs from KKT and FP in some details.  KKT asked a variable 
number of questions (but less than 5) while FP asked each respondent to fill 4 types of 
questionnaires with 4 or 5 questions each. As argued earlier, asking one or two questions reduces 
the possibility of interactions between questions.  The method we use to collect the data also 
differs from KKT and FP. KKT survey was conducted by telephone on a sample of residents in 
two Canadian metropolitan areas. FP survey was sent by mail to a sample of households in 
Zurich and Berlin (550 households in total). That being said, the number of subjects providing 
usable answers in our survey is broadly similar to that of FP (in their sample, between 452 and 
148 households provided usable answers, depending on the question). KKT do not report the 
overall number of subjects interviewed, but the number of answers to their main questions is 
comparable to ours.   
10In Question 5 the initial price is maintained for low demand periods while the vending 
machine charges a higher price when demand is high. This combines both an increase in 
variability and in average price: 
Question 5. Only price increases 
An operator of vending machines has been selling soft drinks at 60c.  The company 
plans to introduce a new vending machine that varies price as a function of 
temperature. The price will increase to 80c when the weather is particularly hot.  
Please rate this new pricing policy as: 
(Completely Acceptable)   (Acceptable)   (Unacceptable)   (Completely Unacceptable) 
As in KKT, there is no reference to the existence of a rationing problem in high demand periods 
before the introduction of price variability. Similarly, there is no reference to the reduction in 
rationing that may be generated by price variations.  About three respondents out of four find this 
unacceptable (either "completely unacceptable" or "unacceptable"), which is consistent with 
answers in KKT (Question 1 p. 729) and FP (Question 1 and 2 p. 298).  This suggests that there 
is no obvious reason to think that our subjects' attitude toward price variability is systematically 
different from that of subjects taking part in previous experiments. 
4 Results
Table 2 reports the survey results.  Question 1, which was presented in the introduction, is 
used as a benchmark to compare other scenarios. The focus is not on the level of acceptability 
but on the difference in acceptability level across questions. Differences in acceptability can be 
clearly seen comparing rows in Table 2. We compare questions 2, 3 and 4 with question 1. We 
start by discussing differences in unconditional means and we show later that the results are 
robust after controlling for demographic characteristics.  
Rationing (dA/dS
Question 2 varies rationing dA/dS. We manipulate Question 1 by not making any 
reference to the reduction in rationing resulting from price variability. We simply omit the text 
“and the vending machines will less often run out of cans”. 
11Question 2. No reference to the decrease in rationing
An operator of vending machine has been selling soft drinks at 60c.  When the weather 
is unusually hot, their vending machines typically run out of cans.  The company plans 
to introduce a new vending machine that varies price as a function of temperature.  
Price would be 40c in cold weather and 80c in hot weather.  On average, prices would 
remain the same.  Please rate this new pricing policy as: 
(Completely Acceptable)   (Acceptable)   (Unacceptable)   (Completely Unacceptable) 
Ignoring the advantage of price variability in terms of lower probability of rationing 
reduces the acceptability by 10 percentage points, from 38% to 28% and the difference is 
statistically significant.  Consumers have a positive attitude toward reduction in rationing.  This 
is consistent with both rational choice and behavioral predictions. An implication is that omitting 
the impact of variable pricing on rationing, as was typically the case in past survey studies, tends 
to bias answers toward a negative attitude toward variable pricing.
Price Variability (dA/dV
Question 3 investigates the main issue of consumer attitude toward change in price 
variability, dA/dV. While in Question 1 price can increase or decrease by 33%, in Question 2 
price increases or decreases by 50%, from the initial 60Cent to either 90Cent or 30Cent, 
depending on weather conditions.
Question 3. High price variability 
An operator of vending machine has been selling soft drinks at 60c.  When the 
weather is unusually hot, their vending machines typically run out of cans.  The 
company plans to introduce a new vending machine that varies price as a function of 
temperature.  Price would be 30c in cold weather and 90c in hot weather.  On 
average, the price would remain the same and the vending machines will less often 
run out of cans.  Please rate this new pricing policy as: 
(Completely Acceptable)   (Acceptable)   (Unacceptable)   (Completely Unacceptable) 
Increasing the price range by 50% decreases the acceptability of the pricing policy by 15 
percentage points, from 38% to 23% and the difference is statistically significant. Consumers are 
hostile toward price variations. This finding is in contradiction with rational choice theory.   
Average Price (dA/dp) 
12Question 4 considers the possibility that consumers care about the average price holding 
constant the price variability (dA/dp). We substitute for the sentence “On average, prices would 
remain the same” in Question 1 with the sentence “On average, prices would decrease to 
45Cent”.
Question 4. Low average price 
An operator of vending machine has been selling soft drinks at 60c.  When the 
weather is unusually hot, their vending machines typically run out of cans.  The 
company plans to introduce a new vending machine that varies price as a function of 
temperature.  Price would be 40c in cold weather and 80c in hot weather.  On 
average, prices would decrease to 45c and the vending machines will less often run 
out of cans under this new policy.  Please rate this new pricing policy as: 
(Completely Acceptable)   (Acceptable)   (Unacceptable)   (Completely Unacceptable) 
Decreasing the average price by 25%, from 60Cent to 45Cent, leaves the acceptability 
substantially unchanged from 38% to 37% and the difference is not statistically significant.  This 
result is surprising.
Linear probability model 
The results are robust after controlling for demographic characteristics.  Table 3 reports the 
results of a linear probability model. In column 1, the constant term can be interpreted as the 
average acceptability of question 1 and the other estimated coefficients as the impact of 
manipulating the survey questions. Column 2 provides the same results controlling for gender, 
parents' education, family income and political preferences. The constant can be interpreted as 
the acceptability of the basic scenario for a male subject, with both parents with less than high 
school education, family income between 32,000 and 53,000 and neither left nor right wing 
political preferences. Only the coefficients corresponding to questions 2, 3 and 5 are negative 
and statistically significant.  We omit from the Table the coefficients on the demographic 
13characteristics because they do not affect the acceptability of the pricing schemes.
13 We test and 
cannot reject the equality of acceptability levels for Question 3, 4, and 5. Table 4 reports these 
tests.
Summary
Two clusters of pricing schemes emerge.  Consumers are indifferent between scenarios 1 
and 4 and between scenarios 2, 3, and 5, and strictly prefer the first group to the second.  Tables 
2-4 suggest the following inference on consumer preferences:   
(a) Consumers value a decrease in rationing dA/dS.
(b) Consumers dislike an increase in price variation dA/dV.
(c) Consumers do not care about average price dA/dp .
There is a trade off between rationing and price variability but no trade off between 
average price and these two dimensions.  The evidence that dA/dV is inconsistent with rational 
choice and consistent with behavioral theory.  The other two findings do not permit to 
distinguish the two theories.  The finding that dA/dS is consistent with both behavioral theory 
and rational choice. The finding that dA/dp  is inconsistent with both theories. 
Implications for Pricing Practices 
In practice, firms use a wide range of pricing schemes to deal with congestion problems.  
Some firms greatly vary prices (e.g. airlines) while others rarely do so (e.g. movie theatres).  At 
first glance, it may be difficult to make sense of the wide variety of variations in pricing practices 
both within and across industries.  Our results provide a starting point and a framework to 
discuss these issues. Two examples illustrate how this could be done.  
13 The interaction of political preferences and income levels with our different pricing schemes does not 
significantly affect the acceptability level. The results of non-linear probability models are not significantly different 
and are not reported. 
14To start, one may consider an industry where firms typically vary prices, and study how 
firms communicate their pricing policies, assuming that such information influences consumer 
willingness to buy.
14  In particular, one would expect that firms should advertise reductions in 
rationing but should not mention the existence of price variability.  Mentioning the feature that 
the average price remains constant or decreases may have little impact on consumer attitudes.  
Consider the airline industry, where price variability is typically large (Borenstein and Rose, 
1994).
15 Firms generally advertise the lowest price for advance booking and do not reveal the 
entire fare structure.  In addition, they do not mention the average price close to departure date, 
which can be 5 to 10 times higher than the lowest price (McAfee and Velde 2006).
16
In the airline industry, rationing takes the form of overbooking.  There is no rationing in 
full fare refundable tickets, but firms sometimes have to overbook economy tickets to make 
space for full fare consumers who show up at the last minute, and also to optimize capacity 
utilization. European low cost airlines do not sell refundable tickets and therefore generally do 
not overbook (ELFAA, 2004).
17  Interestingly, those airlines that do not overbook emphasize 
this feature in their websites and in advertising campaigns while those that do overbook mention 
it only in the contract’s small print.
18  To summarize, the observations that airlines typically 
14 This implicitly assumes that firms can ‘fool’ consumers because a rational consumer should 
care about the actual distribution of prices not about what the firm announces. 
15  Fares are typically determined by the amount of time customers book in advance and the 
number of seats already booked on the flight (see McAfee and Velde (2006) for a review of 
revenue (or yield) management).   
16 A survey of the top 10 European airlines by number of passengers in 2005, shows that none 
advertises its fare structure although several advertise the lowest price for a given route. 
17 “Low Fare Airlines generally do not engage in overbooking (because their fares are 
nonrefundable)... traditional airlines, who offer flexible fares for business passengers, will 
continue to profit from this practice” (p.32). 
18 Among the top 10 European airlines by number of passengers in 2005, 9 airlines acknowledge 
overbooking in their small print, while Ryanair, which is the largest low cost airline in Europe, 
advertises in its charter that ‘Ryanair is possibly the only airline in Europe that does not 
overbook its flights’  (http://www.ryanair.com/site/EN/about.php?sec=charter).  Another low 
cost airline, Vueling, which does not figure in the above ranking, advertises in its statement of 
15advertise the lowest price, keep silent the entire distribution of fare and in particular the fares for 
last minute bookings, and that some low cost airlines advertise the absence of overbooking, are 
broadly consistent with our results.
Secondly, one can pursue an event study approach and investigate why the introduction of 
variable pricing sometimes fails.  As mentioned earlier, it is difficult to draw definite conclusions 
in the Coke failed experiment. Consider instead Deutsche Bahn’s introduction in 2002 of 
revenue management principles to long distance train travel.  The new system abandoned the 
principle of fixed fare per kilometre, and introduced advance purchase discounts (40% for one 
week advance booking), as well as cancellation fees (Seidel et al. 2004).  Interestingly, Deutsche 
Bahn launched this change at a time when it was not making profits and when there was 
congestion at peak hours.  Seidel et al. review 407 articles from the press and conclude that 
consumers perceived that the system was designed to increase average price rather than to deal 
with congestion.
19 Consumers rejected the scheme and Deutsche Bahn had to terminate its main 
features.  Interestingly, fairness concerns is one of the most often cited reason for this failure.
Our framework would suggest that acceptability would have increased if Deutshe Bahn had 
emphasized the lowest prices and the impact of the system on rationing.   
We recognize that these two case studies are very specific.  But the point was to illustrate 
the practical relevance of our framework to (a) discuss how successful schemes that vary prices 
are presented to consumers and (b) understand why consumers sometimes reject new schemes 
that vary prices.  Finally, one could use our framework to discuss variations in firm practices 
across industries, a topic that is beyond the scope of this study.
philosophy that ‘No overbooking. We are the only Spanish airline with who you are sure to get 
your seat once it has been booked.’ http://www.vueling.com/EN/vueling/acerca_02a.php. 
19 In the executive summary, the report states that ‘People felt treated unfairly due to pricing 
according to demand elasticities and cancellation fees.  The infringement of the public’s 
perception of fairness played probably and important role that the system was not accepted by 
the public.’ 
165 Conclusions 
The main objective of this paper was descriptive.  Our survey results documents whether 
consumers are averse to price variations that are meant to smooth demand fluctuations, and if so, 
whether they are willing to trade-off price variations for a reduction in the likelihood of rationing 
or for lower expected prices.  We find that (a) consumers are averse to price variation (they 
dislike pricing schemes that vary prices more), (b) they are willing to trade off price variation 
and rationing, but (c) they are not willing to trade off price variation for lower expected prices.
A secondary objective of this paper is to interpret these findings in light of two 
conflicting theories of how consumer should respond to price variations.  In the context of our 
scenario, we would expect that a consumer behaving according to rational choice would prefer 
the introduction of price variation as long as the level of price does not increase.  The first 
finding rejects this prediction and seems consistent with the behavioural hypothesis that 
consumers are antagonized by price variations.
A final objective is to discuss the implications of our findings for the debate on why firms 
rarely vary prices to deal with congestion problems. Accordingly, we presented consumers with 
a real world situation, similar to the Coca Cola experiment, where more innovative pricing 
schemes could be implemented.  The results suggest that consumers are averse to a scheme that 
sometimes increases prices above a reference level even if it also sometimes decreases prices.  
Our findings also suggest that the most effective way to get consumers to accept a pricing 
scheme that varies prices is to emphasize, assuming that such announcement influence 
consumers’ willingness to buy, its positive impact on rationing and to conceal events when 
prices are high.  These observations seem consistent with casual observations from industries 
where prices do vary.
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18Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
A. Educational Attainment 
Less than high school  High school  College degree  Postgraduate degree 
Mother   .33 .51 .15 .01
Father .33 .45 .19 .02
B. Occupation 
Self Employed Employee Other
Mother   .19 .52 .29

















Centre Somewhat left 
wing 
Very left wing 
.13 .30 .19 .31 .07 
Note: The table reports the fraction of subjects by educational attainment and occupation of their parents, family 
income and political preferences.  
19Table 2. Acceptability of pricing policy changes 
Acceptable Unacceptable N
Question 1. Basic question   0.38  0.62  87
Question 2. No reference to the decrease in rationing   0.28  0.72  93
Question 3. High price variability  0.23  0.77  106 
Question 4. Low average price  0.37  0.63  89
Question 5. Only price increases   0.25  0.75  73
Note: The table reports the fraction of subjects describing each pricing policy as acceptable (either "completely 
acceptable" or "acceptable") or unacceptable (either "completely unacceptable" or "unacceptable"). N is the number 
of observations for each question.  
20Table 3. The acceptability of policy changes (linear probability model). 
(1) (2) 
Question 2. No reference to the decrease in rationing  -0.100  -0.123 
(0.068) (0.072)* 
Question 3. High price variability -0.153  -0.156 
(0.066)** (0.068)** 
Question 4. Low average price  -0.009 -0.009
(0.069) (0.072) 
Question 5. Only price increases -0.133  -0.142 
(0.072)* (0.076)* 
Group 2  -0.068 
(0.058) 
Group 3  0.003 
(0.054) 
Constant 0.38  0.374 
(0.049)** (0.126)** 
R
2 0.02 0.05 
Note: The dependent variable is the acceptability of the pricing policy (equal to 1 if the policy change was 
considered acceptable or completely acceptable, zero otherwise). The number of observations is 448. Standard errors 
in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%.  
21Table 4. Test of equality of acceptability levels across questions. 
H0
Question 5 - Question 3 = 0    F(  1,   421) =    0.04  Prob > F =    0.85 
Question 5 - Question 2 = 0    F(  1,   421) =    0.07  Prob > F =    0.79 
Question 5 - Question 4 = 0    F(  1,   421) =    3.21  Prob > F =    0.07 
Question 3 - Question 2 = 0     F(  1,   421) =    0.24  Prob > F =    0.63  
Question 2 - Question 4 = 0     F(  1,   421) =    2.56  Prob > F =    0.11 
Note: The table reports the test of equality of the coefficients reported in Table 4 for Question 2, 3, 4 and 5.  
22Appendix:  Efficiency Argument for Varying Prices
We review the economic argument based on the efficiency logic, advocating the use of variable 
pricing.  Our goal is to identify situations where rational choice theory predicts that consumers 
should always prefer a pricing rule that varies prices.
Assume there are N states of the world.  State n=1..N occurs with probability Sn such that 
6nSn=1.  A state could represent a day of the week or a month of the year if demand is seasonal 
and in that case Sn should be interpreted as the fraction of time that state n occurs.
Alternatively, demand could depend on underlying stochastic states of nature (e.g. the weather 
in the Coke example).  There is a unit continuum of consumers who consume at most one unit 
and they do so if their willingness to pay is greater than the price. In state n, consumers’ 
willingness to pay are random and i.i.d. with distribution Fn(v) and we assume that Fn are 
continuous functions with full support on [0,f].  Each consumer learns her willingness to pay 
only once the state is realized.  This implies that the aggregate distribution of willingness to pay 
in state n is Fn(v).
There is a fixed capacity Q<1 such that all consumers cannot consume.  The marginal 
cost of serving an additional consumer is zero up to Q and infinite onwards.  This stylized 
representation of situations where capacity is set in advance and is inflexible in the short run is 
consistent with our survey scenarios.   
Consider first the case where the price does not vary.  Assume the price is set at p.  Sales 
in state n are equal to 
qn(p)=Min(1-Fn(p),Q).
In the event 1-Fn(p)>Q there is rationing.  Assuming random rationing, the probability of being 
served in state n is 
rn(p)=Min(1,Q/(1-Fn(p))
and the overall chance of being served is 6nSnrn.  In the event 1-Fn(p)<Q, some of the capacity 
is not used.  Consumers evaluate a pricing rule ex-ante, that is, before they have learned their 
realized valuation.
20 We assume that consumers are risk neutral.
21  A consumer’s expected 
utility is 
) ( ) ( ) ( v dF p v p r EU n p n n n ³ ¦
f
   S
and the expected cost of consumption is 6nSnrn(p)p.
20 Clearly, a pricing rule also has ex-post distributional consequences. For example, not all 
consumers will be identical ex-post under variable pricing.  Those consumers who end up 
consuming in a state of the world when the price is high may be worse off ex-post.  If these 
consumers had known their realized valuation ex-ante, when they were asked to decide which 
pricing rule to adopt, they would have not been in favor of variable pricing.  To eliminate the 
possible ambiguity that may arise with ex-ante versus ex-post considerations, we select scenarios 
where it is clear from the question that consumer should consider the choice of adoption of 
variable pricing from an ex-ante point of view.  Using the notation of the model, we design our 
scenarios so that it is reasonable that consumers do not know where they are likely to end up on 
the distributions Fn, when they are asked to choose between pricing rules. 
21 This is reasonable in the applications we have in mind, because the price of the goods under 
consideration is typically very small relative to consumer income. 
23Consider next variable pricing. The price in state n is pn.  We call a pricing rule a set of pn
for n=1..N.  Sales in state n are qn=Min(1-Fn(pn),Q).  As a benchmark case, we first consider the 
efficient pricing rule that eliminates rationing and unused capacity.  The price in state n is 
p*n=F n
 -1(1-Q).
This set of prices clears the market and achieves the efficient outcome.  To compare 
intermediate pricing rules (between fixed pricing and efficient pricing) we use the following 
definition.
Definition: Pricing rule pn varies prices more than p’n if (a) for any n such that 1-Fn(p’n)>Q,
p*npn p’n and (b) for any n such that qn(p’n)<Q, p*npnp’n, with at least an inequality 
(between pn and p’n) strict in one state.
We can answer the question of whether consumers would be willing to adopt a pricing 
rule that vary prices in the sense defined above.   
Proposition: Consumers strictly prefer a pricing rule that varies prices more as long as the 
expected cost of consumption does not increase. 
Proof: Define EU({pn}1..N) the expected utility under pricing rule {pn, n=1..N} 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) } ({ .. 1 v dF p v p r p EU n p n n n n n N n
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The first term is positive since p’n>pn.  Consider any element in the second term’s sum indexed 
by n.  We have p’n<pn
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The proposition holds even if consumers have to pay a fix cost to find out about the price 
(e.g. travel cost) since consumers would have to pay the fixed cost independently of the level of 
price variation. Under variable pricing, consumers may end up to pay the fixed cost more often 
for nothing, but they are still better off doing so in expectation.
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